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1 Introduction
We live in a world of increasing specialisation and
division of labour. In the corporate world, firms
are globally outsourcing non-core activities, and
specialising in core competences. This repositioning
allows firms to increase productivity and generate
appropriate economic rents. The danger is that
firms lose perspective on the determinants of
systemic efficiency in their value chains, and on the
determinants of dynamic competitive advantage
that may include externalities not seen by individual
firms. An analogous process can be observed in the
research community. We develop increasingly
sophisticated and rigorous disciplinary and regional
specialties, but in the process lose a holistic
perspective on the complex interactions which
determine real-world events.
The challenge that we as researchers confront is
to operate at a variety of levels, to take advantage
of the benefits of specialisation without foregoing
the insights arising from a multidimensional
perspective. In particular we need to find ways of
integrating economy wide and macroeconomic
investigation with meso- and micro-level
production, household and geopolitical analysis.
This is a widely recognised challenge, but one which
seldom results in substantive and integrated
analyses.
This article has two objectives. The first is
empirical, to determine the evolving patterns of
regional and global integration within which the
Asian Driver economies operate. The second is to
develop ways of understanding these emerging
trends, drawing on a multilevel and
multidisciplinary analysis, and setting out a
methodological agenda for future research not just
on the Asian Driver economies, but also on other
regional and global issues.
We begin in Section 2 with the empirical agenda
describing the evolving integration patterns of the
Asian economy. In Section 3, we situate this
empirical reality in two analytical frameworks: the
economic analyses of shallow and deep integration,
and meso/micro analysis of regional clustering and
global value chains. In Section 4, we draw together
these two strands, posing challenges for a more
holistic analysis of the continued dynamism of the
Asian Driver economies.
2 Asian Drivers in the world
economy
Developing countries have experienced sharply
different engagement with the world economy in
the post World War II period, arising partly from
global trends beyond their control and partly from
different choices of development strategies. Out of
this heterogeneity in economic performance, the
Asian Drivers have emerged with a distinct role in
the world economy with respect to their composition
of trade, integration into regional and global markets
(including financial markets as well as factor and
product markets) and the role of foreign direct
investment. Trends in the world economy relating
to regional integration were surveyed last year by
the World Bank (World Bank 2005) and we
summarise some of their findings below.
2.1 Changes in trade patterns in the
postwar period
In the past 60 years, there have been major shifts
in patterns of world trade, with the emergence of
new trading blocs and changes in the relationships
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Figure 1: Mapping the evolution of trading blocs (the data in the boxes denote the share of
total world exports)
Source: World Bank, Global Economic Prospects (2005: Ch. 2).
1960s
In the 1960s the European Union and United States dominate trade
1970s
1980s
1990s
…but by the 1970s Japan and Korea begin to lead an East Asian bloc…
… a decade later the East Asian Tigers, ASEAN countries and Australia consolidate the East Asia bloc …
… and in the 1990s ECA emerges and East Asia trades more with itself than with the US and EU.
between developing and developed countries. We
analyse the trends using trade flows by country of
source and destination–trade matrices (World Bank
2005: Ch. 2). An entry in such a trade matrix shows
the exports from a country along a row to countries
in the columns. Average trade matrices are
constructed using three-year averages of trade flows
for the late 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.
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The
matrices cover all world trade and include 66
“countries”, some of which are regional aggregates.
The data is expressed as trade shares by country,
i.e. shares of total exports to other countries and
shares of total imports from other countries.
A “trade bloc” is defined as a group of countries
which trade “more” with one another than with
countries outside their group. A mathematical
procedure is used to analyse the trade-share data
to find groups of countries that have large trade
shares within the group, and low trade shares with
countries outside the group, using a weighted
average of export and import shares.
2
The procedure
used finds clusters of countries that have the largest
possible average trade share within the cluster and
lowest possible shares between clusters – the
addition of any other country will lower the average
within-cluster trade share and/or raise the average
between-cluster trade share. Economically,
considering a “cluster” as a trade “bloc” requires
judgement about the size and economic importance
of the within-cluster trade relative to trade with
other countries. A simple criterion is that, if within-
cluster trade is larger than trade with any other
cluster, then the cluster can be viewed as a trade
bloc. The application of this clustering procedure
resulted in the identification of natural trading blocs
for each decade from the 1960s to the 1990s.
Figure 1 maps the evolution of these trade blocs,
and Table 1 provides a list of the countries/regions
in the major blocs in the 1990s.
3
From Figure 1, it is evident that the world trading
system in the 1960s reflected a bipolar world, with
Europe and the US forming blocs with some of their
close neighbours, former colonies, and/or Cold War
partners; and with hub-and-spoke links to the rest.
Europe and the US dominate their blocs; the other
countries both within their blocs and in the two
Asian groups trade far more with the US or Europe
than among themselves. It was a world characterised
by “dependency” between the developed centre
and the underdeveloped periphery.
In the 1970s, a realignment of world trade began.
The clustering analysis found three distinct blocs
and two other clusters, with more fragmentation
in trading arrangements. In summary, the 1970s
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Table 1: Consolidation and diversification: the 1990s
Europe+ North America+ Mercosur E&SE Asia Rest
Switzerland Central America & Argentina Australia South Africa+
Rest of EFTA the Caribbean Brazil New Zealand Malawi
Hungary Colombia Uruguay China Mozambique
Poland Venezuela Paraguay+ Hong Kong Zimbabwe
Rest of USSR North America Japan Peru
Turkey Korea Rest of Andean
Rest of North Africa Taiwan Chile
Uganda Indonesia Bangladesh
EU-15 Malaysia India
Philippines Sri Lanka
Singapore Rest of South Asia
Thailand Rest of MENA
Vietnam Tanzania
Rest of the world Zambia
Rest of South Africa
Rest of SSA
EFTA – European Free Trade Association; MENA – Middle East North Africa; SSA – Sub-Saharan Africa.
were characterised by the splintering of the earlier
European and US-centred blocs, and increasing
diversification of trade by countries formerly closely
linked to them. Both the European and North
American blocs became more focused on their core
countries and immediate peripheries. East and
South-East (E&SE) Asia emerged as a new trade
bloc; a major force in world markets, with a larger
share of total world trade than North America.
In the 1980s, the realignment of world trade
continued and the various trade blocs solidified.
As in the 1970s, the clustering analysis found three
blocs and two less distinct clusters. In addition to
the EU and North America, the new E&SE Asian
bloc expanded and solidified, with growing links
to the US. The within-bloc trade shares for Europe
and North America rose, while the European bloc
expanded by one region to include Mediterranean
countries in North Africa (“rest of MENA”). The
North American bloc did not change composition.
The E&SE Asia bloc, however, both consolidated,
increasing the share of within-bloc trade, and
expanded membership, adding Australia and New
Zealand in the region. The within-bloc trade share
remained high, even with increased membership.
Its export share shifted toward the US (Figure 1). It
also represented a growing share of total world trade.
Detailed analysis of country trade data in the
1980s shows two new blocs starting to form. First,
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay increased
their trade shares, anticipating the development of
Mercosur. Second, there was increased trade with
South Africa by its near neighbours, Malawi and
Zimbabwe, indicating the evolution of a Southern
Africa bloc centred on South Africa. While the
appearance of these two nascent blocs is evident in
the data, no other significant blocs seem to be
forming within Latin America, Africa, or Asia.
While the European bloc has expanded to
include more of its periphery, the North American
bloc is essentially stable, and has been since the
1970s. By the 1990s, the bipolar world of the 1960s
evolved into a tri-polar world, with the emergence
of the E&SE Asia trading giant. This bloc accounts
for a larger share of world trade than North America,
and diversified its exports over time away from the
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Table 2: Macro-totals, world economy, 2001
Regional Regional Import share Export share 
GDP imports exports of GDP (%) of GDP (%)
Europe 954.7 100.1 103.7 10.5 10.9
North America 1181.1 113.2 76.4 9.6 6.5
Mercosur 80.7 10.7 9.4 13.2 11.7
China 128.4 42.5 48.6 33.1 37.9
Rest of E&SE Asia 589.8 34.9 32.4 6.6 9.6
India 46.4 7.1 6.2 15.3 13.3
Rest of world 122.6 34.9 32.4 28.5 26.4
World 3103.6 347.3 333.3 11.2 10.7
Shares of world totals (%)
Europe 30.8 28.8 31.1
North America 38.1 32.6 22.9
Mercosur 2.6 3.1 2.8
China 4.1 12.2 14.6
Rest of E&SE Asia19.0 11.2 17.0
India 1.5 2.0 1.9
Rest of world 3.9 10.0 9.7
World 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: From a global Social Accounting Matrix SAMG based on the GTAP dataset 2001.
Units: US$bn, 2001. Regional imports and exports, and import/export shares, do not include intra-bloc trade,
and include trade in goods and non-factor services.
US. The membership of the 1990s blocs are shown
in Table 1.
The emergence of the E&SE Asia trading bloc
in a tri-polar world trading system does not signify
that the world is evolving into three disparate,
autarchic trading blocs. In the 1990s, even with
the emergence of a new major trading bloc,
between-bloc trade was very large. The emergence
of Mercosur and a bloc centred on South Africa
indicates that the process of segmentation and new
bloc formation in world trade is still evolving. One
hypothesis that emerges from this analysis of trading
blocs is that the E&SE Asia trading bloc may expand
further as India and China grow, with increased
trade between them. If South Asia manages to
overcome its history of conflict and economic
isolation, one might well see an expansion of the
E&SE Asia bloc to incorporate South Asia.
The E&SE Asia trading bloc that had emerged
by the 1990s can be put into a broader statistical
context by comparing gross domestic product
(GDP) and trade performance using the regional
breakdown as shown in Table 1 above. This is done
in Tables 2 and 3:
From Table 2, the tri-polar world shows clearly
in terms of shares of global GDP, with Europe and
North America receiving 30 per cent and 38 per
cent, respectively in 2001, while E&SE Asia,
including China, has 23.1 per cent. E&SE Asia and
China have strong export surpluses (in goods and
non-factor services), while North America has a
large deficit. Europe has large extra-regional trade
shares compared with North America and E&SE
Asia. China has much larger trade shares than India,
i.e. over double.
The pattern of inter- and intra-regional trade
shows up clearly in Table 3. Europe has by far the
largest intra-regional trade, a reflection of the extent
of deep integration within the European Union.
E&SE Asia has a comparable share of intra-regional
trade to North America. China trades the most with
its partners in the E&SE Asia region (51.8 per cent),
with the rest split largely between Europe and North
America. India has a markedly lower share of trade
with E&SE Asia compared with China. India’s trade
is diversified, with the largest share going to Europe,
but no strong regional or bloc preference.
2.2 Regionalism and regionalisation in
Asia
Regional integration has differed enormously across
the world in ways that affect trade patterns. We
distinguish two patterns of regional integration.
The first is that driven by formal government-to-
government agreements (e.g. as in the EU or North
American Free Trade Agreement – NAFTA), which
we term “regionalism”. The second is a less
“constructed” and market-driven form of
integration, which we refer to as “regionalisation”.
4
East Asia has followed a regional strategy based
on most-favoured-nation (MFN) liberalisation, but
without any formal cooperation agreements
throughout most of the period. The Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) agreement
embodies the principles of a non-discriminatory
non-preferential approach to trade liberalisation.
This trajectory is closer to regionalisation than
regionalism (as defined above).
East Asia’s increasing trade and investment
linkages are due in part to unilateral reforms, which
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Table 3: Export shares by region, 1998
Europe North America Mercosur E&SE Asia Rest Total
Europe 73.5 9.3 1.2 10.8 5.2 100.0
North America 19.3 49.4 2.5 24.1 4.6 100.0
Mercosur 27.5 20.9 22.7 16.3 12.6 100.0
E&SE Asia 17.9 25.0 0.9 51.2 4.9 100.0
Rest of world 33.1 20.3 2.2 34.7 9.8 100.0
China 19.3 22.3 1.2 51.8 5.4 100.0
India 34.7 22.1 0.8 28.0 14.4 100.0
Source: GTAP dataset for a three-year average for 1997–9. Per cent shares of exports by destination,
including within the bloc, so rows sum to 100.
started earlier than in other regions, and the
fragmentation and relocation of production
processes that has arisen since the mid-1980s. East
Asia’s regional liberalisation strategy led to lower
average tariff rates than most of the other regions
throughout the period. In addition, the periods of
relocation of production processes coincided with
periods of increased foreign direct investment (FDI)
into the countries of relocation. East Asian net
inflows of FDI as a per cent of GDP are higher than
any region from the mid-1980s until the late-1990s.
Even without the support of formal regional
trading agreements, countries in East Asia achieved
lowered barriers to intra-regional trade, and a
“virtuous circle” or synergistic interaction between
open development strategies, increased trade both
within the region and with world markets,
diversification of production and trade, increased
FDI and growth.
South Asia reflects a somewhat different
trajectory from East Asia, with a greater emphasis
placed on formal agreements (“regionalism”) than
market-driven integration (“regionalisation”). It
adopted highly protectionist regimes upon its
independence in the late 1940s, limiting trade.
Unilateral liberalisation and domestic reforms that
were gradually introduced, along with a rapid
expansion in garment/textile exports, led to high
growth rates for exports in the 1990–2000 period
and an increasing share of exports in GDP, but from
a very low base. South Asian exports as a share of
the world trade have remained low throughout the
1980–2000 period.
South Asia has maintained high levels of average
applied tariffs, even compared with the import-
substitution industrialisation period of other regions.
The region is also not integrated in world capital
markets. Net inflows of FDI, although higher than
the early 1980s, is the lowest of all the regions.
Recently, political considerations, as well as
concern about the expansion of trading
arrangements in other regions, have led to an
increase in the number of trade agreements in the
region, the latest of which is the South Asia Free
Trade Area (SAFTA) Agreement (January 2004). In
the 1980–2000 period however, these trade
agreements have had a minimal impact on regional
trade, given continuing high levels of protection,
a lack of meaningful concessions, domestic political
problems and hostility between India and Pakistan.
In summary, the differences between India and
China are significant. China is a strong member of
the E&SE Asia bloc, with high intra-bloc trade
shares, while India is not linked to a particular bloc
and has lower trade shares. These differences reflect
the fact that India lags China in opening to world
trade, but also that India has not sought to join
regional trade agreements or to engage in the kinds
of informal deep integration evident in E&SE Asia.
3 Empirical reality through a
theoretical lens
What theoretical lens can we use to view this
empirical reality of growing trading blocs and
distinctive patterns of regionalisation and
regionalism in Asia? We suggest that three sets of
literature provide insights into this process. Each
is drawn from a different tradition and works at
different levels. Each brings particular insights to
the analysis. Collectively, they provide a more
holistic framework than any single literature.
3.1 Shallow and deep integration
Recent years have seen a series of trade and
macroeconomic analyses which have drawn
attention to what has been termed “intra-industry
trade” (Finger 1975), “vertical specialization”
(Hummels et al. 1998) and “trade disintegration”
(Feenstra 1998). Based on detailed analysis of trade
trends, it has zeroed in on the faster rate of growth
of trade in intermediates than in final products.
One way to measure the role of imported
intermediates in trade is to use an index of vertical
specialisation, which measures the share of the cost
of an export accounted for by imported intermediate
inputs; either directly as imported inputs in the
exporting sector or indirectly through the use of
imported inputs in the domestic production of
intermediate goods used by the exporting sector.
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The data indicate the increasing importance of
“production chains”, whereby production processes
are fragmented and divided across countries.
Intermediate inputs are traded and transformed into
more processed intermediate inputs, which are
moved across borders to the next stage in production.
Sometimes this trade occurs within a single firm
with plants in many countries, and sometimes at
arm’s length, with separate firms specialising in
particular parts of the production process. This
phenomenon is especially important in East Asia,
especially in intra-regional trade, and least important
in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
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Vertical specialisation is one aspect of a broader
process of “deep” integration, in contrast to “shallow”
integration. By shallow integration, we mean
integration that is characterised by the lowering of
barriers (mainly tariffs) to the flow of goods and
services across international borders, through either
unilateral liberalisation, a regional trade agreement
(RTA), or global negotiations under the auspices of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). By deep
integration, we mean the creation of a “common
marketplace” across countries, that permits
enterprises to operate easily across national borders
and to integrate production in regional value chains.
In addition to lowering tariffs, deep integration
involves harmonising market institutions, standards
and legal norms such as commercial practices,
administrative and contract law and regulation of
labour markets and financial investment. Such
integration can be part of a formal trade agreement,
usually an RTA, or evolve informally as economies
deepen trade relations. A key characteristic of deep
integration is a potential synergy between increased
trade, increases in productivity, and growth.
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The different roles of the Asian Drivers, in terms
of shallow and deep integration, are shown
schematically in Figure 2. China is depicted as
linked through both shallow and deep integration
to other countries in E&SE Asia. As a whole
(including China), the E&SE Asian region is linked
to the global economy through shallow integration.
In contrast to China, India’s regional and global
links are mainly through shallow integration. The
other North region is linked through shallow
integration (e.g. US and the EU), while the EU as
a bloc is characterised by deep integration.
3.2 Clustering, externalities and increasing
returns to scale
7
The observed reality of much economic dynamism
in the postwar period has been as much about
regions (Emilia Romagnia in Italy; the M4 Corridor
in the UK; Jutland in Denmark; Route 28 in Boston;
and Silicon Valley in California are some examples)
as about economies. In developing an
understanding of this regional dynamism,
economists, such as Krugman, drew on the work
of Alfred Marshall’s earlier analysis of nineteenth
century British industrialisation (Krugman 1991).
The explanation of the reality of clustered industrial
districts was largely explained in terms of positive
externalities, spillovers, in factor (especially labour)
and product markets. Much of economic analysis
has ignored these positive locational spillovers.
More recently, it has come to be recognised that
the economic dynamism of clustered industries
reflected not only unintended externalities between
enterprises, but also the conscious attempts by firms
and by supportive agencies to foster collaboration
in a competitive environment. Schmitz, for example,
argued that the sustainable dynamism of local
clusters often depended on what he termed
“collective efficiency”, that is: the supplementation
of locational externalities with purposeful
coordinating and cooperative ventures by local
firms, local governments and other agents in the
regional system of integration (Schmitz 1998;
Braczyk et al. 1998). More recently, it has come to
be recognised that innovation, particularly in
knowledge-intensive activities, requires face-to-
face contact so that technological change is often
driven as much by locality (innovators like to live
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Figure 2: Shallow and deep integration
China
Other E&SE Asia
Global economy
India
Other South Other North
Mainly shallow
Mainly shallow
Mainly shallow
Mainly shallow
Shallow and deep
Shallow and deep
in pleasant regions such as Silicon Valley) as being
a consequence of technological advance (see Storper
and Walker 1989 for an early development of this
idea). A common culture and language matter as
well, decreasing imperfections in communication.
The clear message which comes from this literature
is that locality matters for reasons of efficiency. Co-
located enterprises, working with some form of
coordination, and interacting with effective regional
systems of integration, provide powerful external
economies and foster rapid innovation. In a world
of rising energy prices and communication systems
that are often beset by congestion and security
problems, it is likely that these locational economies
will be sustained in the future.
3.3 Production integration in global value
chains
The “internationalisation” of the late nineteenth
century reflected a growth in trade in
complementary products. The role of low-income
economies in this division of labour was as a
provider of commodities and material inputs. In
contrast, the “globalisation” of the second half of
the twentieth century saw a division of labour based
on the ever-finer decomposition of production into
a series of components, sub-components, sub-sub-
components and services (Kaplinsky 2005).
The recognition of this latter phase of
globalisation began with the work on the New
International Division of Labour, emerging during
the 1970s (Helleiner 1973; Frobel et al. 1980) and
the role which global buyers were playing in
facilitating access to global markets. But, more
recently, the growth of these integrated production
systems has been more clearly recognised in relation
to the advance of global value chains (Gereffi and
Kaplinsky 2001). These chains not only involve a
series of input-output relationships, but more
importantly, are subject to chain-coordination and
governance (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001). Key
firms in the chain, sometimes major buyers in
“buyer-driven chains”, at other times technology-
holders in “producer-driven chains”, take
responsibility for the establishment and running
of very sophisticated global value chains involving
many firms in many different countries.
These chains are probably most complex in the
auto and electronics industries, but are pervasive
in many consumer goods sectors such as clothing
and toys. In a more recent development, global
value chains often involve what Gereffi refers to as
‘triangular production networks’ (Gereffi 1999).
These are global production networks which are
coordinated by chain governors in one economy,
for lead-buyers in a second economy. The major
drivers of these chains have been in Hong Kong
and Taiwan, predominantly organising production
in China and in its region, for buyers in the US and
the EU. Allied to this has been the growth of contract
manufacturers in the East Asian region, working
within industry-defined standards, and this has
been especially important in the electronics
industries (Sturgeon 2002).
Much of Asian manufactured exports emerge
from these regional chains, often coordinated by
triangular production coordinators in Hong Kong
and Taiwan. Thus, what often emerges from China
as a “Chinese product” is in fact a product assembled
in China, using capital goods from Japan or Korea,
and involving intermediate inputs from throughout
the region. As a consequence of these imports of
raw materials, equipment and intermediate inputs
(much of which is processed for exports to other
regions), China’s trade deficit with East Asia grew
from US$4bn in 1990 to US$40bn in 2002, and
the region’s share of China’s merchandise imports
grew from 55 to 62 per cent in the same period (Lall
and Albaladejo 2004).
The work on “regional” externalities and value
chains indicates that potential externalities from
regional integration extend to include collections
of countries.
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Deep integration across trade blocs
(such as the EU, North America and the E&SE Asia
bloc) is important for the participants largely
because of potential links to productivity gains that
go beyond standard analysis of comparative
advantage, to include beneficial synergy between
increased trade, increases in productivity and
growth. There are a number of potential “causal
chains”, whereby deep integration might generate
externalities and productivity increases. Standard
trade theory analysis looks for efficiency gains
through better allocation of resources to capitalise
on the comparative advantage. In contrast, the
process of deep integration appears to generate
beneficial externalities, facilitating potential returns
to scale arising from fine specialisation. These gains
are “Smithian” in that they arise from expanding
the extent of the market facing firms. Deep
integration yields three different sorts of such scale
economies or Smithian productivity gains through:
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●trade-driven market expansion
●
specialisation within value chains
●
externalities arising from harmonising standards,
regulations and market institutions.
The potential gains from regional integration
and proliferation of value chains are clearly
significant, but difficult to study. They are outside
the domain of analysis of the core of modern trade
theory, including multi-country trade models that
are based on neoclassical or neoclassical-structuralist
general equilibrium theory. While “new trade
theory” and “new regionalism” attempt to
incorporate some of these linkages, there is as yet
no widely agreed theoretical framework in
economics for analysing these mechanisms. In this
environment, it is best to proceed by approaching
the issues at many levels of analysis, including
assembling case studies, and widening the analytic
net to include more than the main body of standard
economics.
4 Towards a holistic account
We have observed a complex empirical world of
locational agglomeration. Since the end of World
War II, a number of regional blocs have evolved. It
began with the US and the EU blocs dominating
trade in the 1960s, and thereafter with a growing
presence of an Asian trading bloc. Most recently,
this Asian trading bloc has been driven by two newly
dynamic and very large Asian Driver economies,
China and India. Within this Asian trading bloc,
we can observe two very different models: the
market-driven deep integration of China and its
trading partners, and the more internally integrated
shallow-integration production system emanating
from India.
This picture shows up at the economy wide and
macro-level, as summarised in Section 2 above.
The determinants of these patterns of regional
integration, and the source of their dynamism in
global markets, can be better understood by linking
the analysis of deep integration as described with
the meso-level clustering studies and the micro-
level global value chain approach adds an
understanding of the dynamics driving much of
this regional integration. It explains why it is that
China shows up as an exemplar of deep integration;
its integration in regional value chains, often
coordinated by triangular production networks
based in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and lubricated
by multinational corporations sourcing from the
East Asian region as a whole rather than China as
an economy. By contrast, India appears to be a much
more standalone production platform. Its
participation in global product markets (in the
manufacturing sector at least) appears to be much
more like the internationalisation through trade in
complementary products of the nineteenth century
than in the fragmented globalised value chains of
the late twentieth century.
The illumination provided by multi-level
research is not a one-way street of micro- and meso-
level analysis informing macro-level analysis. The
unravelling and analysis of the macro trends
provides important insights into the more detailed
primary analysis, not just showing where the
empirical investigation is best focused, but also
how larger regional dynamics are likely to affect
the future flows of productive resources. Moreover,
the benefits of cross-disciplinary and multi-level
analysis do not end here. Missing from our story
has been the role played by geopolitical and cultural
factors. For example, to what extent does the rivalry
between China and Taiwan on the one hand, and
India and Pakistan on the other, influence the rate
and nature of their participation in their subregional
economies? How important are ethnic ties in the
construction of deep integration; to what extent
are Chinese ethnic minorities involved in the
construction of regional value chains?
The economic performance of E&SE Asia is
impressive, and associated with expanded and
deeper regional integration. In addition, India’s
improved economic performance is also clearly
associated with opening to world markets and
expanding the role of international trade – although
whether the links are causal, and which way
causation runs, are still controversial issues.
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The
potential benefits of deep integration are evident,
but we far from understand how best to achieve
them.
The insights of an holistic and integrative analysis
are not limited to the research agenda, but have
relevance to the policy environment as well. There
are many questions that need to be addressed, and
knowledge gaps that require research. What initial
conditions are required to achieve deep integration,
and ensure that it is beneficial? Deep integration
requires supportive institutions, including political
and legal systems – elements of good governance.
It also requires levels of infrastructure, including
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transport and communications that facilitate the
emergence of production segmentation, value
chains, and associated increases in productivity.
Market organisation matters, in order to ensure that
the gains in productivity accrue to the country or
region, rather than just to downstream producers
and distributors. Whether the poorest countries
can successfully engage in deeper integration, with
associated benefits, and how quickly, are also
important research questions.
Finally, the restructuring of the world trading
system that is accompanying the emergence of the
Asian Drivers has serious impacts on other
developing countries. Markets are expanding, but
many countries are losing markets in the
restructuring. Trade is not a zero-sum game, with
every winner implying a loser, but the benefits of
trade are not distributed equally, and there are losers.
An important part of any work programme studying
the impact of the emergence of the Asian Drivers
must focus on the adjustments required in the rest
of the world, especially the poorer countries.
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Notes
1. The data came from the UN COMTRADE system. The
data have been assembled and cleaned by the Global
Trade and Analysis Project (GTAP) at Purdue University
as part of their work to develop a comprehensive data
bank of world trade.
2. The mathematical procedure specifies bloc classification
as a problem in integer programming. The procedure
determines optimal zero-one assignment of countries to
different trade blocs, maximising within-bloc trade shares
and minimising between-bloc shares. The method was
developed and implemented in the GAMS programming
language by Alex Meeraus and Sherman Robinson.
3. See Ch. 2 of World Bank, Global Economic Prospects (2005).
4. See Schiff and Winters (2003) and Anderson and
Blackhurst (1993) for discussions of regionalism.
5. Given data limitations, measures of vertical specialisation
are imperfect and are not independent of the level of
disaggregation used. For example, a sector which
produces both for exports and domestic markets, which
is common given the aggregation available for sectoral
data, is assumed to have the same production technology,
particularly use of imported intermediates, for goods sold
in either market. Even with these limitations, the measures
provide a picture of the changing role of trade in
intermediates. See World Bank (2005) for a discussion
of these measures and presentation of the results for a
selection of countries for which there are data.
6. For a discussion of deep integration and how “new trade
theory” considers it, see Burfisher et al. (2004). Also see
Evans et al. (2005) and Keller (2002).
7. For a helpful brief summary of this literature, see Schmitz
(2004).
8. See Burfisher et al. (2004) and Evans et al. (2005).
9. See Winters (2004) and Baldwin (2003) for surveys of
this issue.
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